

CHAPTER II

Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity

II.1. WORLD AND PRIMORDIALITY

As we have indicated, the task of phenomenology consists in systematically explicating and elucidating the ontic sense of the world by investigating the intentional-constitutive accomplishments of transcendental subjectivity. If we consider the natural attitude more closely, it immediately becomes clear that apprehending the world as a world in common for all subjects belongs among the most basic assumptions of the natural attitude. It is, as Husserl says, experientially obvious that I and the other perceive the same thing, although my perceptions belong to me and the other's perceptions belong to the other (9/389). The world is immediately experienced as one and the same, although it appears to each experienter in a particular way (3/60[55]). This finding can serve as a leading clue for further investigation.

The world is experienced as our common world. There belongs to its own sense as objective world "the *categorial form*, 'once for all truly existing', not only for me but *for everyone*" (17/243[236]). True being thus not only means being for an individual I, but points a priori beyond the individual I to the nexus of possible intersubjective verification. However, it is not only on the level of theoretical reason that this holds good; rather, as we shall see later, there is already a reference to intersubjectivity at the purely *pre-predicative* level (9/431, 14/289, 14/390, 17/243[236], 6/469). An explication of the ontological structure of the world therefore leads us, by way of this disclosure of the sense of the world as a world for everyone, to transcendental intersubjectivity, for on account of its intersubjective sense, the world necessarily appeals