

is to say, the problem can only arise when these have already been distinguished—which presupposes precisely that the experience of the other has already done its work (1/150):

I do not have an appresented second original sphere with a second “Nature” and, in this Nature, a second animate bodily organism (the one belonging to the other ego himself), so that I must then ask how I can apprehend my Nature and this other as modes of appearance of the same Objective Nature. On the contrary, the *identity*-sense of “my” primordial Nature and the presentiated other primordial Nature is *necessarily* produced by the appresentation and the unity that it, *as* appresentation, necessarily has with the presentation co-functioning for it—this appresentation by virtue of which an Other and, consequently, his concrete ego are there for me in the first place. (1/152; cf. 14/10)

Let us attempt to summarize the considerations up to this point. Husserl claims that when I experience an experiencing other, the validity categories of my experience are subjected to a decisive change. By means of these others, the object is provided with a validity that lends it an independence with respect to my own performance. The object (i.e., the object that is experienced by both of us) is no longer exhausted in its being-for-me, but is torn away from me. Through the other, the object is constituted as reaching beyond me, and this must also be understood temporally. The object can continue to exist after my death, when I no longer stand in any possible connection with it.¹⁰ Thus the categories of *transcendence*, *objectivity*, and *reality* are intersubjectively constituted. They can only be constituted by a subject that has experienced other subjects. Yet Husserl also remarks that the same holds for the categories of *inwardness*, *appearance*, and *immanence*. What he is thinking of is the following. When I experience that the same object can be experienced by several subjects, and that it is given to us in various profiles (13/9), then I realize that there is a distinction between the object itself and its appearance, its being-for-me. What I previously simply experienced as a perceived thing is now transformed into a mere appearance of “the one objectively existing thing”; on the basis of the concomitant synthesis, it has “taken on . . . the new sense ‘appearance of,’” a sense that is “henceforth valid” (6/167[164]; cf. 4/82).¹¹ Thus Husserl says that the expression