

“my appearance of the object” is already transcending, for what is subjectively real for me can only be termed an “appearance” precisely when others are already positable for me (9/453, 13/382):

It is questionable—indeed, more than questionable—whether here, at the level of a thing-constitution that is thought solipsistically, I can designate the appearances as subjective. . . . The introjection of sensations and appearances into a subject, or their apprehension as merely subjective, originates in intersubjectivity. (13/388-89)

What for an individual subject, prior to any relationship of empathy to other subjects, is “world,” becomes “aspect” as soon as a relationship of empathy arises. (13/304)

For the human being who has not undergone the experience of empathy, or from the standpoint of the abstraction from any empathy, there is no “inwardness” of an “externality”; such a human being would have all of the lived experiences—and all of the objectivities, of whatever sort—that are included under the title of inwardness, but the concept of inwardness would be lost. (13/420)

Hence it only makes sense to speak of something “subjective” when I have already experienced other subjects, and have thereby acquired the concept of intersubjective or objective validity. And it is for precisely this reason that Husserl also denies that I can experience subjective appearances prior to the experience of others—that is to say, this very determination is itself intersubjectively derived.

II.4. HORIZON AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

We have now offered a provisional presentation of the constitutive implications of the experience of others. In order to be able to make further progress with the analysis, and to disclose the real radicality in Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the perspective will now be turned around, as it were. We have previously indicated that with Husserl, one can speak of several sorts of relation to others, and that one of them in particular exists *prior to any concrete* experience of others (i.e., prior to any currently actual experience of a particular,